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Competition policy is a ﬁeld where economists and lawyers have to
workhandin handto achieve eﬃciency and, in the international arena,
global welfare. At the present, there is no internationally recognised of-
ﬁcial authority under the auspices of which there would take shape the
global competition policy and, simultaneously, set up a core of global
competition rules. Competition policy, still national or supranational
in its nature, is, as a consequence, under strong inﬂuence of other na-
tional or supranational policies and so regulated by various laws that
in their speciﬁc way address competition cases including those with an
international element. Overlapping of jurisdictions, conﬂicts between
substantive and procedural laws are unavoidable. Considering that full
and simultaneous compliance with all those laws is a hard task to fulﬁl,
it makes cross-border transaction much more risky, time consuming,
andcostlythanisnecessary.Bysetting upanautonomousinternational
court for global competition cases not only would we get rid obstacles
to eﬃcient enforcement of competition but we could make global wel-
fare ﬂourish without depriving developing countries of their economic
growth.
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Introduction
In the era¹ when ideas, goods, services ﬂow without any diﬃculties
throughallaroundtheWorld,wheninformationaboutproducers,prod-
ucts or services they oﬀer is easyily accessible, when it is less and less
dangerous and risky to move the production to the countries where the
costsofproductionarelower,thequestionthatarisesoutis:canwereally
speak about global competition?
With the diﬀerence to the regulation of international trade, there exist
neither a set of international competition rules nor an international in-
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stitution which would deal with global competition problems and solve
competition cases with an international element. This leads us to the
conclusion that at least for now we cannot, from the legal point of view,
talk about global competition law or global competition policy. Hav-
ing regulated international trade without considering or, rather, with-
out having the necessary framework to consider, competition issues that
arise from such a trade cause serious problems in legitimising any state’s
policy trying to preserve a high level of welfare for its citizens.
WhyisGlobal Competition Law Needed?
Despite the fact that we cannot yet talk about global competition law²,
this does not mean that competition on the global market does not exist.
Beforewelookcloseratthewayinwhichinternational competitioncases
are dealt with, we should pose ourselves the question about justiﬁcation
to make competition on global level legally regulated. Considering that
the us antitrust law was originally enacted not for preserving but stop-
ping beneﬁts deriving from competitive behaviour³,t h a tp e r f e c tc o m p e -
titionandsoperfecteﬃciencycannever exist,someone couldeven think
that competition law is something that can cause more evil than good.
Further on we would see that there is even a bit of truth in this, which is
the case if e.g. competition authorities or courts, when dealing with the
competition issues, legitimise as competition policy those practices, or
better those aims that undertakings try to achieve, and that have nothing
to do with competition.
Pure competition certainly does not need any regulation. Everyone is
abletocompetewithhisrivalsinanywayheﬁndseﬃcienttowinthepri-
maryposition over his rivals. Wherethis kind of practice canlead us,it is
not diﬃcult to imagine. Concentration of wealth, power, and the ability
to decide about the quality of life of other people in the hands of some
winners is something that should not beallowed. On the other hand, too
much restriction of freedom of action and much higher protection of
competitors than is necessary can cause the stagnation of progress and
reduction of welfare. At what point of the scale between these two ex-
tremes is the competition policy of the relevant market going to be at a
certain period of time, it is hard to predict well in advance. Competition
policy, which could be fully recognised only through decisions of com-
petition authorities or court judgments, has never as its legitimate object
just allocative eﬃciency. Through competition policy there are pursued
also policies like social, environmental, employment and even political
(e.g. achieving a single market in the eu).⁴ A n da ss o o na st h e r ei sa
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clash between various, in general allowed, recognisable policies it is hard
to predict which of them is going to prevail and so decisively inﬂuence
the decision of the case, except there, where the main objective of the
sovereign institution which either makes or decides upon implementing
variouspoliciescanberealiseddirectlyfromhierarchicallythehighestle-
gal act binding on it (e.g. achieving a common market in the ecTreaty).
But how about deciding on a competition case in which there is
present also an international element? This could happen in the fol-
lowing cases:
1. National undertaking is acting and causing anticompetitive eﬀects
wholly outside national or supranational (e.g. the eu) territorial
borders⁵ of the institution hearing the case.
2. Foreign undertaking is acting and causing (anti)competitive eﬀects
within the national or supranational territorial borders of the insti-
tution hearing the case.
3. National or/and foreign undertaking is/are acting outside the na-
tional or supranational territorial borders of the institution hearing
the case but causing the anticompetitive eﬀects within it.
4. National and foreign undertaking are both acting and causing
(anti)competitive eﬀects within and outside the national or supra-
national territorial borders of the institution hearing the case (in-
ternational merger).
5. National or foreign undertakings, each of them located and per-
forming within diﬀerent national or supranational territory and of-
fering diﬀerent products but at the same time enabling their cus-
tomers access to all their products at once, which gives to this net-
work a monopoly position (new-one network product).
In one of these situations, the institution dealing with a case, would
not, after deciding to have a jurisdiction to hear the case, immediately
apply⁶ its competition law, but would be primarily balancing whether
and to what extent national interests or, rather, the interests of its cus-
tomers and undertakings, are aﬀected compared with the interests of
foreign ones. Taking into account that no institution would act against
the national interests or in such a way as to reduce the welfare of its own
citizens, in practice this means that in case 1 above, the institution is in
general⁷ not going to prohibit the anticompetitive behaviour of its na-
tional undertaking if the anticompetitive eﬀects of such behaviour are
going toriseand remainonlyand whollyoutside itsnational or suprana-
tional territorial borders without at the same time causing its home cus-
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The same could happen with foreign customers’ and consumers’ wel-
fare and overall allocative eﬃciency in case 2 above, regardless of the le-
gality of the undertaking’s action and its eﬀects. In a case where there
is found an obvious breach of competition law which would at the end
result in being obviously worse oﬀ, the case raises no concern. Such an
undertaking¹⁰ would be found guilty for breaching competition law. But
what if the foreign undertaking is behaving in conformity with compe-
tition law and at the same time there exists a risk that other producers
within the importing country would run out of business?¹¹ If it even-
tually happens that competent authorities of the importing state, as a
reaction to such a situation, take antidumping measures or either limit
or completely prohibit the import of such goods or services and so caus-
ing customers and consumers to be worse oﬀ, this kind of practice is, in
our opinion, not really in conformity with competition law, despite the
fact that it could be in conformity with international trade law.
We are going to talk about other reasons that require enactment of in-
ternational competition rules in the next chapter,in order to avoid un-
necessary repetition of some problems that have to be dealt with to-
gether.
At this point, we could conclude only that until the time when we
would not have uniform global competition rules, we could not talk
about global competition, because deciding a competition case with an
international element by using or being subjectively inﬂuenced by na-
tional interests cannot contribute to global allocative eﬃciency and to
global welfare. Apart from this, we should consider that for achieving
real global welfare, the eﬃciency gains should be distributed appropri-
ately among thecountries despite thecontinuous willingnessof thebusi-
ness ﬁrms to move their production and resources to wherever the costs
are lower.¹²
How toDeal with a Global Competition Case?
presentsituation
The ﬁrst thing that the institution in front of which the competition case
is pending has to do is to assess under its own private international law
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whether it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case (enforcement ju-
risdiction). Without going too deep into this issue we can, in general, say
that this issue is dealt with either under the incorporation test,¹³ place
of conduct test,¹⁴ purpose availment tests¹⁵ or, as regards mergers, the
threshold test.¹⁶
After concluding that it has such a right, the next step is to determine
the relevant market. This is nothing more that determining what exactly
are the products that compete between them (relevant product market);
on which exact territories the undertaking in question is in competition
with the other undertaking producing the competitive products (rele-
vant territorial market); taking into account that the present situation
can reasonably change in a determined period of time, thus making the
present anticompetitive behaviour allowed under competition law and
vice versa.
The test to determine the relevant market can vary from country to
country or supranational legal entity¹⁷ and its application is limited to
the relevant market located within its territorial jurisdiction.¹⁸
When dealing with a global competition case, the relevant market can
extend even beyond national or supranational territorial borders. The
case would be e.g. if some countries would promote research and de-
velopment in the way that for others it would be hard to determine well
in advance the characteristics and time when a new competitive product
would enter the market, or capability of the products produced beyond
the territorial borders of the present relevant market that could enter it
far more easily and far more rapidly (e.g. through information technol-
o g yn e t w o r k )t h a nw ec o u l dc o n s i d e ra tt h em o m e n tw h e nd e a l i n gw i t h
the case in issue. In addition, there could also be a case when, consider-
ing the behaviour of undertakings on their nationally or supranationally
territorially limited relevant market, no anticompetitive concern would
be caused; but as soon as we take into account their global network and
so the ability to jointly oﬀer the customers a completely new, worldwide
product (case 5 above), the case could be quite the opposite.¹⁹ For such
cases, the present approach – by trying to deal with competition cases
with an international element by application of national competition
laws – is by no mean appropriate. This is another as to argument why
the global competition law is needed.
After deciding about the jurisdiction issue and determining the rele-
vant market, there remains nothing else than application of the substan-
tive²⁰ competition law of the forum. What kind of policies competition
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lawcanembracewehavealreadyseenearlier inthisarticle.Theissuethat
has raised the most international concerns was that of legal permissibil-
ity and legitimacy to enact the law²¹ to regulate the conduct that occurs
wholly outside the territory of the forum but whose eﬀects occur within
it. This is the so called problem of extraterritoriality, i.e. extraterritorial
application of the national law.
The problem was caused by the uscourt judgment in the Alcoa case²²
and it has not yet been solved. We agree that we should not allow the
intended conspiracies to cause an anticompetitive eﬀect, or behaviours
causing an anticompetitive eﬀect to be safe merely because they were
agreed on or managed wholly outside the country of the forum. But on
the other hand, there should not be considered just the national interest
of the forum where anticompetitive eﬀects occurred, but also the na-
tional interests and competition policy of the country of which the un-
dertakings in question are nationals,and the national interests and com-
petition policy of the country where the action de facto occurred.
The cases in which the court, apart from considering the eﬀect, took
into account also the intention of the parties, and the national interest
of other countries are, for example, the uscases Timberlane,²³ Uranium
cartel,²⁴ and Hartford Fire²⁵ –b u tt h em a i np r o b l e m ss t i l lr e m a i n .I ti s
hard to imagine that the institution dealing with the case would objec-
tively and impartially balance the national interests of the forum and
national interests of the other states (Maier 1983, 590–592; Meessen 1984,
788). It is also hard to accept the decision taken in the Hartford ﬁre case
that there is no ‘true conﬂict’²⁶ between competition laws, if the com-
petition law of one country does not regulate one kind of behaviour or
merely allows it (but does not require it) and competition law of the
other country explicitly prohibits it, thus allowing for the institution of
the forum (i.e. a national competition authority or a court) to decide
the case. This is evident interference with the competition policy as a
part of the economic policy of another sovereign state, especially if the
state chooses the policy neither to order nor to regulate the competition
within its territory (Lowe 1981, 265).
The same concern would occur if it would be allowed for the under-
takings, when concluding the agreement which could raise some anti-
competitive issues, to stipulate the submission clause about which state’s
competition law is going to apply when assessing their behaviour. That
is why this kind of contract clause is not permissible.²⁷
It is evident that each single sovereign state has its own right to decide
Managing Global TransitionsCompetition on Global Market 213
over its economic policy,²⁸ on the other hand, it can abuse such a right
for pursuing aims that are clearly in breach of competition law and the
policy of other sovereign states without facing any legal consequences.
This can happen either if a state acts in its own authoritative power²⁹
or if it enacts a law that compels private parties to behave in an exactly
determined way³⁰,thuscausingtheanticompetitiveeﬀectswithinothers’
national or supranational territorial borders.
what should be done in/forthe future?
Wehave seen abovethat determination of competition policyand its im-
plementationthroughenactingthecompetitionlawsandenforcingthem
is within the complete power of each sovereign state. This means that
there are states that have not yet enacted their competition law statutes,
states that have enacted them but their substance is quite the opposite or
else interferes with the competition policy of other states, and there are
states whose competition law and policy is in conformity with the com-
petition law and policy of other states. For this assessment, comparing
merely the letters of the articles or decisive sentences in the judgments
or administrative decisions is not enough. What should be done is to
compare the real values and national interests that crucially dictate the
ﬁnal solution of the case. Only at the point when these kinds of values
and national interests are going to be shared all around the World are we
going to be able to say that we have legitimate, uniform and completely
eﬀective global competition law.
At least for the present,³¹ it is irrational to expect that such common
values and national interests are going to be shared all around the World.
Requiring that the undertakings from the poor and undeveloped coun-
tries should respect the same rules when acting and competing with un-
dertakings from developed countries, without at the same time consid-
ering also the socio-cultural diﬀerences and environmental protection
(seeJonesandSurﬁn2001,1073;Bushman1980,253,255–56),issomething
that really cannot be seen as fair especially if, with such an expectation,
we hinder the economic progress within those countries. But this does
not mean that there is nothing that could be done towards fostering the
progress towards global competition law.
Under oecd recommendations,³² some countries with almost the
same level of development and quite common sharing of the competi-
tion policy values have concluded bilateral agreements for cooperation
andcoordinationin dealing with globalantitrustcases.Personally, wedo
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not believe that global competition law can be regulated in such a way.
Mergers like Boeing/McDonnell Douglas or Gencor/Lornor can clearly
show that despite such agreements there are always national interests af-
f e c t e di nt h ec o n c r e t ec a s e( P e c k1998, 1169) to dictate the ﬁnal solution.
Apart from this, such an agreement can hardly be fully invoked in front
of judicial authorities because it is always in the hands of the court to
decide if acting in conformity with all the provisions of such an agree-
ment is allowed under national or supranational law. There could be,
for example, a diﬀerent level of protection of privacy and/or important
commercial information that would not allow for institutions having
the jurisdiction to hear the case to exchange such information. This was
evident also in the Microsoft case. The only real positive contribution
towards global competition law that could be found in such bilateral
agreements is the positive comity provision, under which the aﬀected
state is obliged³³ to ask the aﬀecting state to take the action against its
undertaking causing anticompetitive damages in the territory of the af-
fected state before the latter is allowed to start enforcement under its
own national law.
A completely separate question is that of how to solve international
merger (case 4 above) when it is allowed under the national law of one
country, but not under the national law of the other. Deciding on the
merit, international merger should not be distinguished radically from
other global competition cases, but there is one thing that could be done
to avoid these contestable decisions.
By harmonising the thresholds that confer jurisdiction in interna-
tional merger cases it would no longer be possible that conﬂicts of juris-
diction could arise. To achieve this, states should ﬁrst of all (Fiebig 2000,
242) diminish their hegemony and reduce their budget monetary funds
dedicated to dealing with so many (some of them not even important)
international mergers.
The only solution that could properly deal with global competition
cases is by setting up a new, completely autonomous international court
for global competition cases. Embodied with the power to decide not
only on hard-core anticompetitive practices but on all kind of activi-
ties performed by either states or private entities which can raise com-
petition concerns and by considering some private international law
issues,³⁴ considering objectively and impartially various national inter-
ests involved in each single case without forgetting to pursue the aim
of moving towards uniform global competition law that is necessary if
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we wish to achieve the real international – global – trade and worldwide
welfare.
AStepawayfromtheWorldTradeOrganization
Someone could legitimately pose the question of why we need to set up a
completely autonomous international courtfor globalcompetitioncases
if we can take advantage of the already established dispute settlement
body within wto (Mitchell 2001, 358) – some of its agreements already
covering competition matters (Mitchell 2001, 359–61;M a t s u s h i t a2004,
364) – and what counts the most, to deal jointly – within the same case –
with both, trade and competition issues?
By regulating competition policy within the framework of the wto
and at the same time modifying the existing wto settlement rules that
would allow³⁵ also³⁶ private parties to bring the claim, both against the
wtomember states and other private parties, we could obtain the com-
plete trade liberalization, with fully opened markets, fair and equal busi-
ness opportunities for every participant in the market, transparency and
fairness in the regulatory process, the promotion of eﬃciency, and the
maximization of consumer welfare³⁷.
It is more than evident that, merely under the existing set of the wto
rules, such an aim cannot be achieved. Within the ambit of purely pro-
tectionist rules³⁸, where the looking on the global trade is from each sin-
gle national market perspective (Drexel 2004, 446) and where govern-
ments are allowed to undertake countervailing measures for protecting
domestic industries regardless of the fact that in such a way they may
trade oﬀ the economic well-being of their people, there is no room for
eﬀectiveness and distribution of welfare. The caseis even moreserious as
there exists the real and lawfully supported³⁹ opportunity for the private
restraints of international trade.
Whether there is any worth in having such an international legal sys-
tem, in which the prohibition of governments’ obstacles to the interna-
tional trade could not be circumvented by private parties’ practices, is
an issue beyond the scope of this article; what does count, however is
that this problem was made evident, and not only at the wtoSingapore
Ministerial Conference in 1996 – when the wto Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition policy was established – but
also in distant 1948 when the Draft fundamental document for the Inter-
national Trade Organization (Havana Charter⁴⁰) was written.
The attempt to regulate competition policy within the wto ﬁnally
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failed at the Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003,w h e nd e v e l o p -
ing countries did not accept the proposal (prepared by wto Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition policy – and
mostly forced by eu Countries) to set up competition law rules within
their national territories considering minimal standards agreed at inter-
national level. There is no necessity for deep analysis of the real reasons⁴¹
for the Cancun failure, but what was even more than evident was the
fact that by accepting the wto Working Group proposal, the develop-
ing countries would give away the advantages of special and diﬀerential
treatment that they had been enjoying till then under the wtorules.⁴²
Three points to consider are: that there really exists a huge gap be-
tween the levels of the economic situation, competition regimes, legal
tradition,andculturalcontextamongvariousstates;thattherehavetobe
considered various national interests in deciding a speciﬁc global com-
petition case; that there are products or national resources that raise
the global competition problems without having anything to do with
trade⁴³.T h e r e f o r e ,f r o mo u rp o i n to fv i e w ,t h em o s te ﬃcient way to deal
with the global competition issues, is by setting up an autonomous in-
ternational institution which would consider in every single case all the
relevant (national) interests, objectively and impartially balancing them,
taking into account thepositions, rightsand duties conferred onthe par-
ties by bilateral and multilateral international treaties and, of course, al-
ways having in mind the main purpose of promoting, achieving, and
protecting global competition and ensuring appropriate and fair distri-
bution of welfare among consumers of various parts of the world.
Some ProceduralProblemsin Enforcing a Competition Case
Everyone would agree that it would be worthless to have properly bal-
anced competition law that mirrors the competition policy perfectly
without being able to enforce it. As we have seen above, until the time
when there would be an international institution that would have the
power to primarily deal with global competition issues there would be
national courts and national competition authorities dealing with such
cases.
Being a competitor acting not only within national borders but also
within the territories of other states⁴⁴ or being merely a consumer, who
was a trade-oﬀ of the beneﬁts that would otherwise occur in the case
of fair competition, you should be aware which authority can decide on
competition issues, for what purposes the authority is dealing with the
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case, who has a right to start and conduct the procedure till the ﬁnal
decision on the case is taken, who has to provide the evidence of anti-
competitive harm, and who pays the costs of procedure.⁴⁵
Wearenotgoingtodiscussallthoseissuesindepth,butwhateveryone
should know is that, if you wish to obtain damages for anticompetitive
harm you have occurred, it is up to you to start the civil procedure in
front of the court that has the right, under the private international law
of the forum, to hear the case and to provide all the evidence necessary
to prove your allegations. Considering that national legal systems diﬀer
amongoneanother,thateachofthemhasitsownrationale,eachofthem
mirrors its tradition, culture, state of development business ﬁrms and
their advisors and so must learn to keep abreast of a multitude of legal
systems. That such diversity in legal systems, and so in legal standards,
increases the costs of doing business⁴⁶ around the World is not hard to
realize.
In addition to all these concerns, we should not be surprised if, from
time to time, we ﬁnd ourselves, when presenting the case, in the position
when it would be legally not possible to obtain the evidence or sensitive
data located within the jurisdiction outside the forum, or when we could
be deprived from full enforcement of the ﬁnal judgment, which could
be the case if the defendant did not have any assets within the jurisdic-
tion of the forum. Additional obstacles to full enforcement of our rights
could derive from so-called blocking statutes enacted by other states to
protect their citizens from extraterritorial enforcement of other states’
competition law.⁴⁷
Conclusion
It is not yet possible to speak about global competition law. Deal-
ing with the competition cases having international element there are
(supra)national competition authorities or (supra)national courts, de-
ciding on jurisdiction and merit by applying their own laws and giving
a partial priority to their national interests (Fox 2003, 923–24; Soma and
Wiengarten 2000, 42; Fiebig 2000, 234–37).
Objective and impartial dealing with such international cases would
be possible only by having a completely autonomous international court
for global competition cases that could contribute to the expansion of
those kinds of values and interests that would enable global competition
law to be formed and enforced all around the World, and so making
international trade fully beneﬁcial for our common welfare.
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1 About the changes in global economy see also Fox 1995, 8.
2 That is, in the sense of having a core of international – global – com-
petition rules that would be binding all around the world.
3 See DiLorenzo n.d., 6.
4 Competition law has potent historical, economic, political, and so-
cial roots that make it a market nation’s ultimate forum of public law.
Shortofreadingawrittenconstitution,anation’scompetitionlawwill
tell you the most about its economic and political system and whether
it puts its faith in the commands of the government or the operation
of the market (Waller 1997, 395).
5 At this point, we intentionally avoid to using the appropriate form of
the term jurisdiction in order to avoid confusion with the explanation
hereafter.
6 As a legal act through which the state is implementing its competition
policy at the concrete behavior.
7 Subject to the positive comity provision in the eventually existing in-
ternational bilateral agreement on cooperation in competition mat-
ters. Concretely, we are going to discuss this provision hereafter.
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(see Bellis 1979, 661).
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dertakingsof the eumemberstates is Javico case (Javico International
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ing territory(the ecjcase: Woodpulps case (Ahlström oy v. Commis-
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11 Consider the ban the eu posed on the import of Chinese textiles.
12 The same Fox 1995, 12 and Drexel 2004, 440.
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14 Here we consider whether the undertaking in question was actively
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hearing the case has jurisdiction.
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tion.
16 Legal acts that regulate mergers clearly state in which cases the com-
petent institution is going to hear and decide upon merger.
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in price changing that is stated to cause switching of consumers is in
the range between 5%a n d10%, (see Wish 2001, 27–8).
18 Jurisdiction – right – to hear and decide the case determined by the
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19 See Soma and Weingarten 2000, where they present such a multina-
tional network eﬀect on the case of Broadcast-Media and News cor-
poration.
20 Some of the procedural law issues will be analyzed more closely in the
chapter of this article.
21 So called prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e. the right of states to make their
laws applicable to persons, territory, or situations (Jones and Surﬁn
2001, 1039;W i s h2001, 392;M a i e r1983, 582).
22 United States v. Aluminium Company of America, 148 f. 2nd (Second
Circuit, 1945).
23 Timberlane v. Bank of America, 549 f. 2d 597 (9th Circuit) 1976 and
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application of the law of the forum on the foreigners’ conduct oc-
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makes part ofit. As a consequence,state lacks the powerto enforcethe
foreign competition policy as part of a wider foreign economic policy.
(See Lowe 1984, 519, 522, 524–525;R o s e n1981, 217, 222;L o w e1981, 277.)
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1984, 804.
29 This case is regulated by the Act of State doctrine. For example, the
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32 About them see Waller 1997, 361–62.
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convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, these
being a consequence of the diversity of law of contracts and torts
among various member states.
35 Under the present regulation, this is not possible, except for cases of
dumping,statetrademonopoliesandcompaniesenjoyingexclusiveor
special privileges (Castrillon 2001, 101). See also Matsushita 2004, 370;
Fox 1995, 9.
36 The wto rules seek to supervise government restriction on trade
(Charnovitz 2003, 829).
37 This is the key concept common to both, the wto and competition
policy (Matsushita 2004, 364).
38 See Mitchell 2001, 363,G r i ﬃn 1997, 40.
39 At least not prohibited (see the footnote 35).
40 See Fox 1995, 2–3.
41 For them see Stewart 2004;D r e x e l2004, 435–37.
42 Consider Nottage 2003, 33–34, 44, where he also stressed the problem
of capability and costs that the developing countries would incur in
setting up the eﬃcient competition law system.
43 In this regard see also Leon 1997, 164, 175 and Griﬃn 1997, 39.
44 The physical presence within the territory is completely irrelevant.
What count are the results and eﬀects of your activity.
45 Forthereasonswhy privateenforcementofthe competition law in the
us is much more frequent than in the eu see Baundenbacher 2002,
365.
46 About this, see also Fox 1995, 14.
47 About the British blocking statute see Jones and Surﬁn 2001, 1045,
Wish 2001, 393 and, 407,R o s e n1981,B u s h m a n1980,L o w e1981.
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